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Relearning Liberation:
Critical Methodologies for the General Crisis
Sarah S. Amsler1 and Nancy Weiss Hanrahan2
Abstract: How can critical theory help us to articulate the nature of social suffer-
ing in twenty-first century capitalism, and to expand our horizons of possibility
for liberation and alternative futures at a moment of apparent impasse? In this
essay, we explore how critical theorists across three generations in the European
Frankfurt School tradition articulated the ‘struggles and wishes’ of their age and
place, and reflect on the contextual limits and enduring relevance of their nega-
tive, utopian, democratic and ethical methods. We then turn to developments of
this work in the Latin American tradition, particularly as elaborated by feminists,
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which articulate critical theorizing as a transformative praxis within the material
construction of dignified communitarian life. In the final part of the paper, we
consider what we might learn about how to theorize our own dominations and
liberations through this critical methodology.
Introduction
t is a difficult time to be working for radical social change or theo-
rizing its possible trajectories. Many struggles for basic human dignity
and alternative futures have recently emerged within what Nancy
Fraser3 calls a ‘general crisis complex’ as simultaneous crises in social
reproduction and care, economic distribution, ecological sustainability
and political authority ‘intersect with and exacerbate one another’. As
the human and ecological ravages of financialized capitalism intensify
around the world, people are struggling to find respite from and alterna-
tives to conflict, destitution and hopelessness. Faith in the basic institu-
tions of liberal democracy, where they were functional, has shattered as
militarism, xenophobia and racism have resurfaced as political virtues.
At the same time, people’s capacities for economic self-determination
and self-realization have been eroded by the expansion of multinational
capital into social institutions and everyday life. The reproduction of life
itself – already so precarious in many parts of the world – has become
more uncertain even in nations with substantial material resources and
wealth. The severity and complexity of these crises thus demand new
political narratives with which to name and theorize the causes of social
suffering at this historical conjuncture.4
We thus begin this paper by asking: to what extent do the categories
used by US and European critical theorists actually articulate diverse po-
litical aspirations or express the nature of social suffering today? We
3 Nancy Fraser, ‘Democracy’s crisis’ lecture given at Erasmus University (Rot-
terdam, 2014) (accessed at http://www.publicseminar.org/2014/11/democra-cys-
crisis/#.WcUatMiGOHs). See also Fraser’s article ‘Contradictions of capital
and care,’ New Left Review, 2016, 100 (accessed at https://newleftreview.
org/II/100/nancy-fraser-contradictions-of-capital-and-care).
4 Fraser, “Democracy’s crisis”.
I
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suggest that the political ideals of liberation, democracy, equality and
dignity which have oriented movements for social change since the
nineteenth century cannot on their own guide us toward emancipatory
possibilities. First, while these terms still often appear as universal ideals
in progressive political discourse, they emerged from local histories of
struggle and hope. Each offers a different analysis of the forms and
causes of social domination, immiseration and injustice; each prioritizes
different political values and objectives; each opens onto a different
horizon of possibility; and each has itself been implicated in oppressions.
Second, given the ongoing dismantling of liberal democratic sensibilities
and institutions by marketisation, the growing instability of wage-based
livelihoods and the dispossession of communal means of production, the
fragmentation of organized labor, the weakening of international
infrastructures for protecting human and environmental rights, and the
institutionalization of authoritarian power at all levels of political
decision-making in formerly democratic societies, these terms no longer
name easily imaginable futures. Finally, these modern concepts and
ideals, like other ‘new identities, rights, laws and institutions of moder-
nity such as nation-states, citizenship and democracy were formed in a
process of colonial interaction with, and domination/exploitation of, non-
Western people’.5 For these reasons, the categories of analysis that have
historically oriented critical theorists do not adequately capture the
nature, scope, complexity, intensity, variety or unequal distribution of
twenty-first century domination.
However, these terms do continue to play an important role in our
thinking. Understanding how their meaning has shifted in time and
place through different projects to clarify the ‘struggles and wishes of the
age’6 can therefore help us to understand how new vocabularies of
5 Ramon Grosfoguel, ‘Decolonizing post-colonial studies and paradigms of po-
litical-economy: transmodernity, decolonial thinking, and global coloniality,’
Transmodernity: Journal of Peripheral Cultural Production of the Ludo-Hispanic World, 2011,
1(1): 12. Accessed: http://escholarship.org/uc/item/21k6t3fq.
6 Karl Marx, ‘Letter to A. Ruge, September 1843,’ in Karl Marx: Early Writings, trans.
Rodney Livingstone and Gregor Benton (New York: Vintage Books,
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emancipation have emerged at the intersections of theory and practice. In
this paper, we explore how three ‘generations’ of critical theorists con-
ceptualized social emancipation in historically and geographically specific
ways. We take critical theory as our starting point because while no
intellectual tradition can claim a monopoly on theorizing responses to
domination, critical theory’s historical commitment to identifying social
contradictions, naming forms of domination and illuminating latent po-
tentials for emancipation makes it a fruitful ground for this investigation.
Starting from the notion of liberation as ‘negation’ that is associated with
the Frankfurt school, we map the shift toward an interest in liberal and
social democracy in the postwar period and then, given the limitations of
this strategy, towards a reconsideration of the foundations of social justice
in everyday life and the ontological and ethical politics of recognition and
respect. We also explore the resignification of dignity as a practice of
liberation by some critical theorists in both the global South and the global
North, while noting concerns which have been raised about depoliticized
notions of dignity within the ‘ethical turn’ in European social thought. In
the final part of the paper, we propose that the contextualiza-tion of such
key terms and their critical appropriation into new thinking is a method
that might allow us to reopen emancipatory possibility within critical
theory. Our hope is that this investigation will contribute to ‘imagining
this form of life differently by disclosing other possible ways of carrying it
forward, other ways of “going on”’.7
Liberation as negation
For the early Frankfurt School theorists, both capitalism and fascism bar-
barized dignity, destroying the moral and political fabric of human re-
lations. The multiple and interwoven forms of domination that surfaced
in Germany during the period of National Socialism thus begged a more
1975), 209. Quoted in Nancy Fraser, ‘What’s critical about critical theory?
The case of Habermas and gender,’ New German Critique, 1985, 35: 97.
7 Nicholas Kompridis, Critique and Disclosure: Critical Theory between Past and
Future (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006), 254.
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comprehensive theory of liberation than either the critique of capitalist
social relations or the psychological and cultural distortions of authori-
tarianism could provide. The depth and scale of destruction wrought by
industrialized war and genocide, combined with the absence of any con-
ceivable possibilities for redemption within modern economic and polit-
ical institutions, gave rise to definitions of liberation as the triumph over
‘negative ontology’ where, in Karl Marx’s words, ‘Man exists as a degrad-
ed, exploited, debased, forsaken and enslaved being. 8 In this context, lib-
eration was thus defined as a negation of that which negates and denies
humanity and its creative potentials. Seeking to understand why and how
people ‘by their own toil keep in existence a reality which enslaves them in
ever greater degree’,9 Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno10 located the
source of domination in Enlightenment reason itself. They argued that
instrumental rationality was evidenced in every dimension of modern-day
domination –extermination camps, mass mobilizations, psychological
repression, anti-Semitism, total administration and the culture industry –
and this had dangerous consequences for critique. For if reason was being
re-mythologized in Aryan nationalist propaganda and the technological
marvel of the death camps; if its instrumentaliza-tion was not only
necessary for capitalist production but also generative of genocide and
torture, then the most important function critique could play would be a
negative one – to negate ‘realities’ that are presented as rational. Axel
Honneth11 later argued that Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of
Enlightenment offered a form of ‘world-disclosing’ critique, in
8 Werner Bonefeld, ‘Negative dialectics and the critique of economic objectivity,’
History of the Human Sciences, 2014, 29(2): 71, has argued that Marx’s critique of
political economy was a ‘negative ontology’. Here, we acknowledge the
influence of this argument on first-generation critical theorizations of society
and extend it to the concepts of reason and liberation.
9 Max Horkheimer, ‘Traditional and critical theory,’ Critical Theory (New
York: Seabury Press, [1937]1972), 213.
10 Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment
(New York: Continuum, [1944] 1997).
11 Axel Honneth, ‘The possibility of a disclosing critique of society: the Dialectic
of Enlightenment in light of current debates in social criticism,’ Constellations,
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which contradictions revealed through dialectical analysis did not point
affirmatively toward a reality or truth behind appearances, but rather
disclosed possible worlds both realized and unrealized in their historical
configuration. We further read the Dialectic as an emancipatory act in its
own right, asserting – albeit imperfectly and individualistically – an au-
tonomy of thought and undistorted human subjectivity that the authors
believed were on the verge of being entirely liquidated. However, like
the high modernist art that Adorno valorized as a rare space of modern
freedom, this critique was radical resistance in a vacuum as it was
detached from the practices of any concrete social base or community of
struggle. In this context, where there seemed so little possibility of
translating the spirit of critique into practice without annihilating it, then
critique, like art, ‘must remain alienation’.12 Thus was alienation from
reality, wrought through actively negating reality, conceptualized as a
liberatory activity.
The revelatory power of negative critique became less compelling,
however, in the postwar period amidst the material conveniences of con-
sumer capitalism and construction of welfare state democracy. Writing in
the United States during the 1960s and 1970s, for example, Herbert
Marcuse proposed a conception of liberation that had a more affirmative
character, as the criterion for social action that ‘would conform with the
very logos of life, with the essential possibilities of a human existence, not
only mentally, not only intellectually, but also organically’.13 This ‘pacified
existence’14 would entail a reduction of power and of overproduction, less
television, and the practice of a meaningful politics in which people
actually direct the social institutions that structure their lives. Yet while
Marcuse found more hope for the possibility of praxis, his critique
7(1).
12 Herbert Marcuse, ‘Art and revolution’ in Counterrevolution and Revolt
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1972), 103.
13 Herbert Marcuse, ‘Liberation from the affluent society’ (1967). Accessed:
http://www.marcuse.org/herbert/pubs/60spubs/67dialecticlib/67LibFro-
mAfflSociety.htm.
14 Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964).
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also remained essentially negative as he found few resources to enact
such liberation within either capitalism or communism. Instead, both
liberal and collectivized freedoms had become institutionalized, one-di-
mensional and repressive, preserving only the illusion of freedom within
different types of totalitarian social relations. Liberation had therefore to
proceed dialectically towards the ‘definite negation’ of the system
through a ‘total mobilization’ that mirrored the mobilization of the dom-
inant policies of the day. This, however, not only had to work with ev-
ident and lived social contradictions, but also to ‘activate the repressed
and manipulated contradiction’ through new forms of art and education
that ‘involve the mind and the body, reason and imagination, the intel-
lectual and the instinctual need, because our entire existence has become
the subject/object of politics, of social engineering’.15
From liberation to social democracy
Where the first-generation Frankfurt School theorized emancipation in
response to fascism and the holocaust, the next generation responded to its
aftermath. John Abromeit16 sees Jürgen Habermas’ project, for example, as
having been consistent with the need of the postwar German state to
reconstruct its ties to liberal democratic traditions after fascism, and it was
hardly a unique case. After the revolutionary eruptions of 1968 in Europe,
there was a palpable shift in the types of justice claims being made by
social movements across the continent, and an ‘ethical turn’ in social and
political thought more generally in which there was less talk of ‘liberation’.
Vazquez-Arroyo argues that from the 1980s, Anglo-Euro-pean societies
underwent processes of depoliticization during which all radical political
projects – represented in the 20th century by both fascism and Marxism –
were cast as unreasonable, unethical and at odds with the ideal of a
victorious individual humanism. The consequent ‘aspira-
15 Marcuse, ‘Liberation from the affluent society’.
16 John Abromeit, ‘Right-wing populism and the limits of normative
critical theory,’ Logos: A journal of modern society and culture, 2017, 16(1-2).
Accessed: http://logosjournal.com/.
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tion to find normative principles outside the political realm’17 marked a
retreat from programmatic politics by altering not only definitions of
liberation but the very relationship between liberation and time.18 Rather
than striving to imagine and actualize radically alternative futures – ac-
tivities that were argued to be courting disaster – critical thought and
practice were channeled into redeeming and preventing the repetition of
past catastrophe through strengthening democratic culture and human-
itarian politics.
‘Democracy’ rather than ‘liberation’ – or more accurately, liberation
through democracy – was promoted as both the frame and the aim of
critical theory that was allied to many social movements at this time. In
the US, for example, much feminist theorizing turned away from grand
narratives of liberation towards concrete struggles for democratic rights,
social and economic inclusion, and redistributive power for women and
minority populations. This shift is clearly reflected in the change in no-
menclature from ‘women’s liberation’ to the ‘women’s rights’ movement.
Habermas’ conceptualization of democratic politics as the realization of
reasoned, egalitarian, discursive deliberation oriented towards systemic
social change was influential in this shift. So too was the work of Nancy
Fraser, who in 1985 wrote that the struggle for women’s autonomy was
one for ‘a measure of collective control over the means of interpretation
and communication sufficient to permit us to participate on a par with
men in all types of social interaction, including political deliberation and
decision-making’.19 Yet Fraser and other feminist critical theorists
recognized that inclusion and ‘participatory parity’ were not panaceas.
Capitalist workplaces, the public sphere and social movements were rife
with informal exclusions and abuses that no discourse ethics could ame-
liorate. Pushback against struggles for liberation within patriarchal and
17 Antonio Vázquez-Arroyo, Political Responsibility: Responding to Predicaments of
Power (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), 25.
18 Jacques Rancière, ‘The ethical turn of aesthetics and politics,’ in Aesthetics and
its Discontents (Cambridge and Malden, MA: Polity, 2009). 119.
19 Fraser, ‘What’s critical about critical theory? The case of Habermas
and gen-der,’128.
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capitalist institutions therefore occasioned explorations into the deeper
ontological and epistemological violence that is inflicted by the denial of
human recognition. Some theorists, such as Axel Honneth,20 defined this
primarily as a problem of ethical politics, of how to ensure that all
‘subjects are able to experience intersubjective recognition not only of
their personal autonomy, but also of their specific needs and their par-
ticular capabilities’ in society, and thus secure adequate conditions for
identity-formation, self-realization, and the good life. Fraser21 centered
political demands for participatory parity and the equitable distribution
of material resources and recognition as key conditions for enabling peo-
ple regardless of individual or group identity to be ‘full partners in social
interaction’.
As claims for both recognition and redistribution became established
in the Eurowestern grammar of social justice by the late twentieth cen-
tury, they remained rooted in and bounded by liberal assumptions of
equality and justice. Yet ‘recognition’ is often not desirable where it re-
quires or confers visibility and viability within a logic of domination, a
point neglected in theories of recognition produced from positions of
racial, class, gender and geopolitical privilege. As bell hooks pointedly
wrote, ‘women in lower-class and poor groups, particularly those who
are non-white, would not have defined women’s liberation as women
gaining social equality with men [...] Knowing that men in their groups
do not have social, political, and economic power, they would not deem it
liberatory to share their social status’.22 Further, following Silvia Federici,
any ‘logic of an analysis that sees women’s oppression as caused by their
exclusion from capitalist relations inevitably results in a strategy for us to
enter these relations rather than destroy them’23 – which is rather
20 Axel Honneth, ‘Recognition and justice: outline of a plural theory of
justice,’ Acta Sociologica, 2004, 47: 363.
21 Nancy Fraser, ‘Recognition without ethics,’ Theory, Culture & Society,
2001, 18(2-3): 24.
22 bell hooks, ‘Feminism: a movement to end sexist oppression’ in Feminist The-
ory from Margin to Center (New York and Boston: South End Press, 1984), 19.
23 Silvia Federici, ‘Counterplanning from the kitchen (1975)’ in Revolution at
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the point. Conversely, not all experiences of ‘misrecognition’ are neces-
sarily forms of injustice. When engaged as a pedagogical site, according
to Nicholas Kompirids, as ‘the occasion of a transformative and critical
encounter with another’, certain forms of misrecognition can open up ‘a
decentered space in which to learn about identities, problems and pos-
sibilities that are not legible (i.e., cannot be recognized) within the dom-
inant grammars and frames of power.24 Moreover, ‘hidden or disguised
processes’ and ‘new or unnoticed possibilities’ for radical alterity may be
revealed through such encounters.25
Given these complexities, articulating injustice primarily in terms of
intersubjective misrecognition reflects a narrow view of the aim of critical
theory to serve the ‘minimization of relations of domination, not a social
world without or beyond power relations’.26 Yet since the end of the
twentieth century, there have been growing criticisms of the desire for
recognition or participatory parity within hegemonic social and conceptual
systems, and more efforts to understand how we can create knowledge, live,
and practice autonomy and justice in everyday life outside these grammars
of power. As John Holloway writes, the demand now is ‘not for “more
democracy” but for a radical reorganisation of our daily activity, without
which the call for “more democracy” means nothing at all’.27
Grounding liberation in dignity and social reproduction
Situating the theorization of liberation within the everyday problem of
how to create, sustain and reproduce life demands engagement with ‘a
Point Zero: Housework, Reproduction and Feminist Struggle (Oakland, CA:
PM Press, 2012), 29.
24 Nicholas Kompridis, ‘Struggling over the meaning of recognition: a matter
of identity, justice or freedom?’ European Journal of Political Theory, 2007, 6(3):
283.
25 Nicholas Kompridis, ‘From reason to self-realisation? Axel Honneth and the
“ethical turn” in critical theory,’ Critical Horizons, 2004, 5(1): 351.
26 Amy Allen, The End of Progress: Decolonizing the Normative Foundations of Crit-
ical Theory (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), xiv.
27 John Holloway, Crack Capitalism (New York: Pluto Press, 2010), 86.
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politics of knowledge that is both ingrained in the body and in local his-
tories’.28 It also therefore requires that we disentangle theories of libera-
tion from assumptions about the primacy (or possibility) of rationalist,
individualist and institution-based approaches to social justice and pay
more attention to intergenerational and ecological ethics, collective and
communal care, and co-operative labor in which democracy is a means
rather than an end. This approach departs from Enlightenment ideals
such as achieving liberal representative democratic consensus, as was so
important for Habermas in postwar Germany, and signals not a retreat
from democratic politics but a more inclusive and materially grounded
commitment to democracy’s democratization.
This mode of critique has recently been advanced in the global pe-
riphery29 and spaces of ‘structural exile’ throughout the capitalist world
system.30 While it engages with classical critical theories of domination, it
stretches beyond the Eurocentric horizons of the Frankfurt School, which
Enrique Dussel argues ‘ceased to be truly critical’ in its second genera-
tion.31 In his view, while critical theory had once accounted for the com-
28 Walter Mignolo, ‘Geopolitics of sensing and knowing on (de)coloniality,
border thinking, and epistemic disobedience,’ Transversal (2011). Accessed:
http://eipcp.net/transversal/0112/mignolo/en.
29 Enrique Dussel, ‘From critical theory to the philosophy of liberation: some
themes for dialogue’, Transmodernity: Journal of Peripheral Cultural Production of
the Luso-Hispanic World, 2011, 1(2). Accessed http://escholarship.org/uc/
item/59m869d2. Dussel defines the contemporary global periphery as that
which is ‘identified with those oppressed by or simply excluded from the
world system’ in Ethics of Liberation In the Age of Globalization and Exclusion
(Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2013), 47.
30 Andre Grubačic and Denis O’Hearn, Living at the Edges of Capitalism: Adventures
in Exile and Mutual Aid (Oakland: University of California Press, 2016), 250.
‘Structural exile’ is a term used to describe nonstate spaces in which,
‘although people work, produce, and trade in the capitalist economy, they
also do activities that are not fully incorporated into the structures of capi-
talist accumulation’ and live in a contradictory relationship to the state and
the capitalist system; see Andre Grubačic and Denis O’Hearn, ‘Capitalism, 
mutual aid, and material life: understanding exilic spaces,’ Capital & Class,
2016, 40(1): 152.
31 Dussel, Ethics of Liberation In the Age of Globalization and Exclusion, 208.
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plex dynamics of dehumanization in the domains of ‘will, affectivity and
emotions, unconscious drives, and economic requirements’ in its time and
place, the later discursive and pragmatic turns in critical theory neglected
the experiences and needs of ‘victims of social evil’ throughout the world
who face nothing less than the need of constructing a ‘new, postcolonial,
postcapitalist and transmodern social order’.32 Dussel thus proposes a
praxis of liberation which is based not upon the development of
autonomous reason or the ‘liberation of inherent possibilities’ within
existing social systems, but upon ethical commitments to the defense of
life, social consensus with respect to decisions affecting collectives, and
non-domination in all proposals or courses of collective social action.
Today’s feminist critical theorists go further to argue that knowledge
and practice of liberation is rooted not only in the defense of life but in its
creation, through ‘processes and human activities that favor the dignified
reproduction of life, even amidst the devastation imposed by
capitalism’.33 In these emerging traditions, it is the human ‘capacity of
giving form’,34 that is, of choosing and shaping our own sociality and
future, that is the starting point and source of critical understanding.
When people, overwhelmingly women, create and sustain life within
systems of life-threatening oppression, they create counter-realities and
concrete utopias that attest to the possibility of alternative realities, even
when they are met with forms of violence which negate their legitimacy.
Rather than focusing on the negative critique of capitalism’s totalitarian
logic, these theorists articulate and affirm the different kinds of knowl-
edge that are needed to ‘self-determine the goals, rhythms and forms
32 Dussel, ‘From critical theory to the philosophy of liberation: some
themes for dialogue,’ 17, 24.
33 Raquel Gutiérrez-Aguilar, Mina Lorena Navarro Trujillo, and Lucia
Linsala-ta, ‘Producing the common and reproducing life: keys towards
rethinking the political’ in Ana C. Dinerstein (ed). Social Sciences for An Other
Politics: Women Theorising without Parachutes (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2017). 80.
34 Bolivar Echeverría, ‘El “valor de uso”: ontología y semiótica in Bolivar
Eche-verría, Valor de uso y utopia (México: Siglo XXI, 1998).
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of everyday life’ that exist within, despite and in defiance of capitalist,
patriarchal and racist-colonial oppressions. This knowledge is not pro-
duced in order to advance academic debates or to inform imagined po-
litical subjects and institutions, but created in collaboration, alliance and
solidarity with embodied communities of struggle as part of the ‘real
insurrection of women’ against heteropatriarchal capitalism across the
world today.35 This mode of critique as affirmative praxis ‘negates by
means of affirming life in, against and beyond capital’. As Ana Dinerstein
explains, ‘while negative praxis ignores the tensions and contradictions
that exist between the compulsion to reproduce life through money and
the need to destroy value-money in order to live, affirmative praxis
navigates those contradictions encountered in the process of venturing
beyond capital’.36 Today, this form of critique is being developed by fem-
inist scholar-activists working in Latin and South America, but it res-
onates with women’s resistance movements and commoning practices
across the globe. The critique of heteropatriarchal capitalism emerges
through the socialization of childcare and domestic labour, the reclama-
tion of land for subsistence farming, and the collective organization of the
defense of life against physical and emotional violence, the rise of popular
feminisms37 and above all, the ‘active cultivation and nurturing of
relations among those who are part of a communitarian weaving, and of
relations of protection and healing between that communitarian weav-
35 Raquel Gutiérrez, ‘Because we want ourselves alive, together we are dis-
rupting everything: notes for thinking about the paths of social transfor-
mation today’, Viewpoint Magazine, 7 March 2018. Accessed: https://www.
viewpointmag.com/2018/03/07/want-alive-together-disrupting-every-
thing-notes-thinking-paths-social-transformation-today/.
36 Ana Dinerstein, ‘Concrete utopia: (re)producing life in, against and beyond
the open veins of capital,’ Public Seminar, December 7, 2017. Accessed:
http:// www.publicseminar.org/2017/12/concrete-utopia/.
37 See Silvia Federici, ‘Feminism and the politics of the commons,’ The Com-
moner (2011). Accessed: http://www.commoner.org.uk/wp-content/up-
loads/2011/01/federici-feminism-and-the-politics-of-commons.pdf. and
Gutiérrez, ‘Because we want ourselves alive, together we are disrupting ev-
erything: notes for thinking about the paths of social transformation today’.
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ing and it surroundings’.38 The promise of this critique is not that we can
refuse the social totality or refine democratic processes and sensibilities,
but that it places the collective reproduction of dignified life at the heart
of emancipatory knowledge production. It assumes that liberation
requires negation (of that which negates life), but also nurtures an affir-
mative drive towards social reproduction that habilitates life beyond and
against capital (which uses life as a means for its own reproduction).
Relearning liberation
‘Dignity, for me, is always the starting point for political and
moral autonomy; [...] dignity is always necessary, but not suf-
ficient for the unfolding of struggles for social and political
transformation. The “what else is needed?” constitutes, I think,
the heart of the contemporary militant political debate.’39
This brief reflection on how critical theorists have attempted to articulate
the ‘struggles and wishes’ of their age and place illustrates that creating
adequate understandings of liberation is a temporally and spatially
contextualised activity that is interwoven with shifting relationships to
different forms of reason. It proceeds not only by adapting existing cate-
gories and methods of analysis to new situations, but also as individuals
with complex positionalities create new concepts in dialectical encoun-
ters between theory and practice in everyday life. The difficulty of this
work is now felt acutely in places where the ongoing ‘crisis complex’ of
capitalism has left not only the organization of society but also previous
imaginaries of its liberation in shambles.
In the global North, just as traditional mechanisms of democratic pow-
er have been eviscerated and new ones have not yet emerged, so theo-
38 Gutiérrez, Linsalata, and Navarro, ‘Producing the common and
reproducing life’.
39 Gutiérrez, in Veronica Gago, ‘Rebuilding a dissident common sense: an inter-
view with Raquel Gutérrez’, translated by L. Mason-Deese, “Making Worlds:
A Commons Coalition” (2013). Accessed: http://www.makingworlds.org/re-
building-a-dissident-common-sense-an-interview-with-raquel-gutierrez/.
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retical capacities are under strain and new political narratives have not
yet come into being. Here, capital has become such a strong ‘organising
principle of society’ that it governs ‘not only human powers but also the
institutions through which human life is dominated’ and the concepts
through which we form our understandings of them.40 A particular dif-
ficulty in the theorization of contemporary liberation here is that many
critical theorists working within modernist rationalities and institutions
struggle to conceive of a world-making agent that is genuinely collective
or communal rather than individual or institutional, and in which
dispossession by state or market power might be countered with self-re-
productive activities. This is not simply a problem of positionality or a
deficit of reason; within advanced capitalist societies, political subjects
are individualized, divided and fragmented, and they often do not share
material such as land held or worked in common, or live in self-organiz-
ing communities, which offer spaces for realizing and creating theory in
practice. We thus cannot appropriate the theories of our colleagues in the
global south, as we do not share the experience of the material
production of life from within which these are emerging. Yet we can,
and indeed must, follow their method of disembedding concepts of lib-
eration from their universalist assumptions and asking if they might be
put back together in an emancipatory form more fitting for our time and
place, developing new critical tools as needed.
We can also learn from the radical critiques of domination, the radical
theorizations of liberation that are happening every day. As racist
violence, austerity politics, ecological destruction and the marketisa-tion of
social institutions intensify, people across the global North are struggling
to proliferate possibilities for liberation; to understand how to effectively
affirm and defend the dignity of life, community and social reproduction.
We can see ‘the production and circulation of relatively au-
40 Ana C. Dinerstein and Michael Neary, ‘Anti-value in motion: Labour, real
subsumption and the struggles against capitalism,’ in Ana C. Dinerstein
and Michael Neary (eds) The Labour Debate: An Investigation into the Theory and
Reality of Capitalist Work (Aldershot-Burlington: Ashgate, 2002). 207.
Relearning liberation: Critical methodologies for the general crisis 69
tonomous and partially incorporated exilic spaces and practices’ in local-
ized struggles for food sovereignty, public and common space, housing,
education and health within what Andre Grubačic and Denis O’Hearn
call the ‘infra-politics of the world economy’, where people are slowly
building new foundations for militantly dignified thinking, acting and
learning.41 The Spanish indignados (M-15) mobilizations saw alienated,
disposable and discarded workers embodying dignity by rejecting gov-
ernment-imposed economic ‘austerity’ (deprivation and dispossession)
and demanding decent conditions for livelihood, labour, housing, edu-
cation and political participation. In the US, Black Lives Matter and the
#SayHerName campaign have revolutionized the collective defence and
affirmation of Black life, dignity and justice by articulating the struggle
against racial violence, genocide and dictatorship and asserting the right
to a safe, just and dignified human existence.42 Revolutionary energies
are not ‘exhausted’ in the North, even within the general crisis complex
of financialized capitalism. On the contrary, there is a palpable hunger; a
felt ‘lack of something and also escape from this lack’, which – according
to Ernst Bloch – signals ‘the beginning of every movement towards
something’.43
41 Andre Grubačic and Denis O’Hearn, ‘Capitalism, mutual aid, and material 
life: understanding exilic spaces,’ Capital & Class, 2016, 40(1): 160.
42 #BlackLivesMatter is described by Alicia Garza (who co-founded it with
Patrisse Cullors and Opal Tometi) as an ‘ideological and political
intervention in a world where Black lives are systematically and
intentionally targeted for demise’ and an ‘affirmation of Black folks’
contributions to this society, our humanity, and our resilience in the
face of deadly oppression’. The women founded it as a ‘call to action
for Black people after 17-year-old Trayvon Martin was post-humous-
ly placed on trial for his own murder and the killer, George Zimmer-
man, was not held accountable for the crime he committed. It was a
response to the anti-Black racism that permeates our society and also,
unfortunately, our movements’. For more information about the her-
story, principles and activities of the movement, see ‘About’ Black
Lives Matter (2017): http://blacklivesmatter.com/who-we-are/.
43 Ernst Bloch, The Principle of Hope (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1959/1995). 306.
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Within this movement for twenty-first century liberation, however, it is
important to critically theorize the conceptual repertoires with which we
are working. This cannot be a case of merely applying existing critique in
order to reveal the distance between our ideal of a liberating society and
its instantiation. This dissonance is already clear. Nor can it be only a
matter of seeking to further democratise liberal democracy, because it is
hard to know what democracy can mean in a context of corpo-ratized
institutions, or how it is relevant to struggles for the basic dignity within
formally democratic societies. Noting the exhaustion of utopian energies
in the early ‘aughts’, Kompridis asked: once we have used theory to
critique everything to death, including critique itself, what do we take
forward from the tradition and what must we leave behind?44 In response
to Fraser’s call for new political narratives, we return to the core concern
of critical social theory from its inception – to give voice to and ease social
suffering – and seek paths towards liberation from there.
As economic and political conditions in the US and Europe deteriorate,
the contours of possible futures become visible in the suffering of those
who live on the outermost edges of this system, who suffer its ravages
without being pacified through reaping its privileges. If existing theories
of democratic deficits, denials of dignity and inequality cannot adequately
communicate and explain the nature and diversity of social suffering in
our time, then we need to find new words that do. These words must
enable us to both articulate and hear suffering caused by impediments to
individual autonomy, self-realization or social recognition, as well as the
reality of people’s struggles to ensure their own survival and face chal-
lenges to a liveable life; that is, to living a viable life with others. Theories
of community, connectedness and collectivity are needed to balance the
more structural theories of class and status, race and gender that on one
hand provide insight into the dynamics of social groups and capitalist
social relations, but on the other also legitimize our separations. We are
also reminded here of something Susan Sontag wrote about liberation in
the 1970s: that sexual liberation wasn’t about women having more sex, but
44 Kompridis, Critique and Disclosure: Critical Theory between Past and Future.
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about what kind of sex women were being liberated to enjoy.45 Similarly,
the task of critical theory today is not only to assess possibilities for more
equality, democracy or dignity, but to again strive to articulate the kind
of life we want to be liberated to live. Neither ‘liberation from the
affluent society’ nor liberation from immiseration can be accomplished
through sheer negation or refusal; today, as ever, liberation advances
also through the recognition and affirmation of possibility.
Two moves at least are required to make room for this work. One is to
decentre the intellectual gravity of Europe and the US in critical theory to
make conceptual space for alternative epistemologies to become visible.
For example, ‘identity’ might be experienced as a ‘mutual belonging
(cobelonging) to a common world’ rather than ‘a relation among similar
beings’;46 the ‘human’ might be understood as a historically specific and
dynamic collectivity that decentres the European notion of ‘man’ as
autonomous individual;47 and ‘commoning’ can refer to the ongoing
activity of producing our social lives in common, that at the same time
produces ourselves as a common subject.48 Another is to learn from ex-
isting but repressed or devalued imaginaries that are part of our own
historical-theoretical repertoire. This includes art, which once had a very
central place in critical theory. Adorno wrote eloquently and often about
how and why art expresses suffering. If connecting deeply with social
suffering rather than simply analysing it is part of liberatory theory, then
art is a potential resource for that understanding, whether because it
‘opens the established reality to another dimension: that of liberation’49 or
it aims to repair the bonds of community, as does the range of art practices
identified with the recent ‘ethical turn’. These lessons are hard, for
45 Susan Sontag, ‘The third world of women,’ Partisan Review, 1973, 40.
46 Achille Mbembe, Critique of Black Reason (Durham: Duke University
Press, 2017). 1.
47 Sylvia Wynter, ‘Unsettling the coloniality of being/power/truth/freedom: To-
ward the human, after man, its overrepresentation – an argument,’ CR: The
New Centennial Review, 2003, 3(3): 257–337.
48 Federici, ‘Counterplanning from the kitchen (1975),’ 145.
49 Marcuse, ‘Art and revolution,’ 87.
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just as Eurocentrism in critical social theory has invisiblized the knowl-
edges and experiences of those in the global south, so too have we have
cut ourselves off from critical aesthetic experiences of the world. Yet it is
clear that at this critical conjuncture, new methods of theorizing libera-
tion are needed. We still agree, as Horkheimer claimed in 1937, this ‘will
not take place via solidly established practice and fixed ways of acting,
but via a concern for social transformation’.50
* The authors wish to thank Claire Anderson for her assistance in
preparing this paper for publication.
50 Horkheimer, ‘Traditional and critical theory,’ 241.
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